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Abstract One must take country-specific institutional features into account when analyzing
former communist countries’ transformation process to new political institutions. We do so
for post-communist Albania, where the regional and cultural polarization that has existed for
centuries has evolved to clientelism in the new democracy. We show how clientelistic parties
give rise to very particular voting patterns. These reveal major differences across regions not
only in party choice but also in voters’ responses to government policies. These responses
depend on the party in government and on the region concerned. This is in sharp contrast
with results obtained when applying the same model to a large number of more advanced
democracies with similar electoral institutions. A proper evaluation of democratization in
Albania thus requires looking beyond the formal institutions governing elections and taking
clientelism and its effect on voter behavior into account.
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1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, the political and economic development of former-communist
countries has been sensational. For scholars interested in democratic processes, it is a chal-
lenge to try to understand the nuances of what is happening. Both political scientists and
scholars in the discipline of public choice have contributed substantially to our understand-
ing of the transformation process from communism. From a political science perspective,
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it is important to realize that the road to democracy implies not only free and legitimate
elections but also deeper political participation and government accountability. One con-
clusion often put forward is that many ‘transitional countries’ are currently functioning in
a gray zone between authoritarianism and democracy.1 Public choice scholars tend to fo-
cus on specific aspects in the political economic development of these countries (such as
changes in the popular vote, certain government policies, or trends in the size of govern-
ment). This literature provides several applications of standard research methods to a cross
section of these countries for general insights or to specific countries as case studies.2 The
conclusions in this literature are quite diverse, however, and it is not yet possible to distill
general implications from it.
In this paper, we use techniques inspired by the public choice tradition to study a question
that is central in the political science literature in this area. We focus on the development of
one country in particular, to wit, Albania. More specifically, we will study how specific fea-
tures of Albania’s political institutions interact with voter behavior. Our focus on one country
is motivated by the belief that it is important for the understanding of many phenomena in
post-communist countries that country-specific institutional features are taken into account
(North 1990; Carothers 2002; McFaul 2002). In Albania, one of the features that may be
important is an alleged clientelism between parties and voters (Klosi 1997) that runs paral-
lel to a strong polarization in the Albanian society. Here we focus on the consequences of
this clientelism and provide an empirical analysis showing that it affects voting behavior in
a way that is very unlike the patterns observed in very many developed democracies.
For our empirical analysis, we estimate so-called vote functions3 and are able to show that
(i) clientelism plays an important role in determining how Albanians vote; (ii) neglecting the
existence of the polarization caused by clientelism can bias not only the conclusions drawn
from the application of standard techniques, but also the policy implications based on ideal
institutional frameworks.
2 Clientelism in Albanian politics
Albania has hardly ever had a democratic political system. In about four decades of com-
munist dictatorship it was completely isolated. The political regime was dictatorial and the
economic system was completely socialized. In the early 1990s, Albania was the last of the
Central and Eastern European countries to allow political pluralism and introduce demo-
cratic institutions and market mechanisms.
Since the break up of communism, there have been two major parties in Albania: the De-
mocratic Party of Albania (DPA, in office 1992–1997 and since 2005) and the Socialist Party
of Albania (SPA, in office 1997–2005). In the three elections considered here, the two par-
ties received 70–80% of the votes cast. The remaining votes were spread over more than 25
parties, with no party receiving a share of more than 5%. The fall of the communist regime
in 1992 brought the DPA to power. Until 1997, the political regime was characterized by
‘competitive authoritarianism’ (Levitsky and Way 2002), while the economy appeared to be
1For examples from political science, see Carothers (2002), Diamond (2002), Levitsky and Way (2002), and
Schedler (2002).
2Fine examples of such research may be found in Shleifer (1997) and Fidrmuc (2000). For similar research
from a political science perspective see Kostadinova (2003).
3As mentioned above, this method is commonly used in the field of Public Choice. For overviews, see Paldam
(1991) or Mueller (2003).
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growing reasonably well. However, the economic numbers may be biased and moreover the
privatization process was used to increase DPA’s popularity through clientelism (Shala 1997;
MPEP 1997; UNDP 2000; Gërxhani 2006). In any case, all that was achieved was demol-
ished in 1997, when a collapse of the ‘Pyramid schemes’ led to complete political and eco-
nomic chaos (Sadiraj 1999; Bezemer 2001). The SPA won the 1997 elections and remained
in government until the DPA regained power in 2005. After a slow start, some democratic
progress was achieved reflected in a shift from a competitive authoritarian regime to an
electoral democracy.4 At the same time, the economy has been growing at a constant rate
but unemployment remains at high levels. In this paper, we focus on the DPA-run years
1992–1997 and the SPA-run years 1997–2001.
The post-communist political system in Albania is a parliamentary representation, with
a mixed first-past-the-post and proportional voting system.5 The parliament elects the presi-
dent. The president appoints and discharges the prime minister and the cabinet. Because the
parties are structured very hierarchically (Sali Berisha of the DPA has been leading the party
since the start of transition and Fatos Nano led the SPA until 2005 and still remains very in-
fluential today), political power is heavily concentrated in the hands of a few top politicians
of the winning party. When a party wins an election, the leader either becomes president
or prime minister himself or appoints someone faithful to him. Moreover, important public
officials are replaced by the winner’s protégés. In short, since the start of the transformation
process the winner of Albanian elections (either the SPA or the DPA) has virtually obtained
unchallenged control over public policy.
Most scholars agree that there is an important cultural and linguistic polarization in Al-
bania (e.g., Shala 1997; Haefner 1999; La Cava and Nanetti 2000). This polarization is ge-
ographically based, dividing the country into a northern and a southern region. Historically,
the polarization of society runs parallel to the existence of two main clans in Albania, to wit
the Ghegs (northern-based) and the Tosks (southern-based). Doll (2003) argues that they go
back far in history. A regional division was first noticeable in 395 AD, and a clan-based
polarization may have started as early as 1081, with the introduction of feudalism by the
Normans. This polarization continued during the Ottoman occupation in the 16th century,
the turbulent years of Albania’s independence in 1912, the monarchy in the late 1920s, and
was still detectable during communism. It has an important influence on various aspects of
the Albanian society. Politics are one such aspect, the one we focus on.
The two main political parties geographic bases match closely the country’s regional
polarization: the democrats (DPA) are culturally and politically closely related to the
north and the socialists (SPA) to the south (Klosi 1997; Vickers and Pettifer 1997;
Gërxhani and Schram 2000; La Cava and Nanetti 2000). The links between the parties
and cultural/regional groups are much stronger than the usual representation of interests
observed in most democracies (Vickers and Pettifer 1997; Gërxhani and Schram 2000).
The relationships between parties and regional groups have many of the characteristics
that would make Lauth (2000) classify the DPA and SPA as “clientelistic parties”. Following
Schmidt (1992), Lauth describes clientelism in general as “. . . forms of protective relation-
ship of mutual benefit between a person or persons occupying a higher place in the social
hierarchy (patron) and a following concerned with protection and the acquisition of certain
advantages (clients)” (p. 27). Lauth classifies different types of clientelism along two dimen-
sions: (i) whether the relationship is based on the social or political system; and (ii) whether
4Diamond (2002); in particular, see Table 2, where the Freedom House score for Albania in 2001 is 3.4.
5For more details about the Albanian political system, see ICG (2001).
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political participation takes place directly or indirectly. One of the forms of clientelism with
direct participation in the political sphere is dubbed “clientelistic parties” (p. 29). This is
characterized by (1) openness in participation (as in free elections); (2) competing patron-
client relations (as DPA-northern voters vs. SPA-southern voters); (3) most patrons (i.e.,
Albanian politicians) coming from the political ‘establishment’ (as in the appointment of
key political positions in Albania, as described above).6
The patron-client relationship this categorization yields runs two ways. First, parties will
bestow ‘gifts’ upon their clients (i.e., the region they are connected to). An example is the
way in which the DPA used the privatization process and numerous appointments to key
governmental positions to give political and economic favors to the north. For example, in
1994, the unemployment rates were approximately equal in the north and south. Yet, 35.3%
of the population in northern regions received social assistance and only 11.2% in south-
ern districts (Gajo 1999). When the SPA came to power in 1997, the reverse occurred: it
appointed most individuals from the south and aimed policies towards this region. Gërx-
hani and Schram (2000) and Case (2001) provide more evidence on the behavior of the
patron side of the clientelism. Here, we focus on the second channel, namely the one run-
ning from client-voters to patrons. The main expectation is that when their ‘own’ party is in
government, voters will support it no matter what. Because of the numerous ways the party
helps them and is expected to keep on helping them, their votes are not affected by specific
(e.g., economic) outcomes of these policies. In particular, we formulate the following main
hypothesis:
Hypothesis When the DPA (SPA) is in office, voters in the south (north) react negatively to
economic swings, which they attribute to the government. Voters in the north (south) have
a strong alliance with the governing DPA (SPA) irrespective of its economic policies. In
the central region, which is much less affected by clientelism, voters always evaluate the
government by its policies.7
Note that we focus on economic policies. There are two main reasons to do so. First,
economic indicators are generally of a quantitative nature and therefore suitable for formal
testing of hypotheses. Second, there is a rich literature (to which we refer in the following
section) relating economic outcomes to voter behavior. Focusing on economic policies en-
ables a comparison of our results to this literature which, in turn, allows us to distill the
effects of clientelism. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to empirically test the
consequences of clientelism in this way. We do so in the following section.
3 Polarized voting behavior
For our empirical analysis we consider the results for the Albanian general elections in
1996, 1997 and 2001 and categorize the 35 electoral districts into the regions: northern (11),
6Lauth (2000, p. 33) also argues that systems with clientelistic parties are often observed in environments
where there are also “kinship structures” such as clans. This reinforces the idea that Albania is currently
characterized by this kind of clientelism.
7One might be tempted to conclude from the hypothesis that parties should support the ‘other side’ because
that is where votes are to be gained. This would mean a collapse of clientelism, however, in the end leading
to a loss of votes in the own region.
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Table 1 Election results for DPA relative to SPA
1996 1997 2001
Result Unemployment Result Unemployment Result Unemployment
North 66.2 11.0% 48.0 16.5% 59.5 23.9%
(8.1) (4.2) (12.6) (8.1) (6.8) (8.6)
Central 62.3 13.3% 26.2 18.4% 40.3 14.8%
(12.4) (7.1) (16.1) (11.5) (11.4) (8.4)
South 48.4 9.2% 17.8 13.7% 35.1 15.3%
(9.6) (4.3) (7.6) (8.0) (9.0) (6.0)
Total 59.1 11.3% 30.4 16.3% 44.7 17.8%
(12.5) (5.6) (17.7) (9.4) (13.9) (8.6)
Notes. Standard deviations are in parentheses. ‘Result’: votes for DPA as a percentage of votes for DPA and
SPA.
central (13) and southern (11).8 Table 1 summarizes the election results and reports the
unemployment rate per region. Detailed information about the data used is available from
the authors.
Note the tremendous decrease in the popularity of the DPA between 1996 and 1997.
The difference across regions is also remarkable. Independent sample t-tests (with unequal
variance) show that pair-wise differences are statistically significant at the 1% level ex-
cept (northern-central) in 1996, (central-southern) in 1997 and (central-southern) in 2001.
Support for the DPA is therefore significantly lower in the south than in the north. This re-
inforces the notion of political polarization between the north and south with the northern
voters supporting the DPA and the southern voters supporting the SPA. In order to show
that this polarization is founded on clientelism we investigate the hypothesis presented in
the previous section, that the response to economic policies is dependent on the governing
party in both regions.
To test the hypothesis, we need an indicator of economic policies. In the public choice
literature, there are numerous examples where the relationship is studied between economic
policies and government popularity.9 Various indicators have been used in these studies.
Nannestad and Paldam (1994, p. 216) conclude that the two that consistently affect votes
are unemployment and inflation. Unfortunately, data on inflation per district in Albania are
not available. Moreover, the Phillips curve relates the unemployment rate to inflation. For
this reason, some authors choose to exclude inflation from the analysis even if they have
the data available. Therefore, we focus on the unemployment rate as a key indicator of
government policy.10
Next, we need to describe how a government’s policies (i.e., unemployment) affect its
support in elections. To do so, we model the way in which voters determine their choices at
an election. The model distinguishes between three types of voters, to wit, clients of the DPA
8Unfortunately, we have not been able to obtain the economic data needed to do the same analysis for the
2005 elections.
9For an overview, see Nannestad and Paldam (1994) or Mueller (2003).
10Fidrmuc (2000) concludes that unemployment is the most acute consequence of economic transition from
communism. In addition, Bell (1997) concludes for Poland that unemployment constitutes the most important
economic variable for explaining voting patterns. Therefore, we believe that our restriction to unemployment
rates as an economic indicator used to evaluate government policies will not seriously bias our results.
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clients of the SPA and non-clients. For the reasons discussed above, we assume that there
are no SPA-clients in the north and no DPA clients in the south. In principle, non-clients
may live in any part of the country, and there may be SPA as well as DPA clients in the
central regions of Albania. To enable the development of an empirically tractable model, we
now assume that the number of non-clients in the north and south is negligible compared to
the number of clients and that the reverse holds in the center of the country.11
Then, we consider voting behavior in Albania’s 35 voting districts (denoted by i).
Each district uniquely lies in one of the three regions r ∈ {north, central, south}. Now de-
fine by Uilg the utility that a voter l in voting district i attributes to government party
g ∈ {DPA,SPA}. Similarly, Uilo denotes the utility that this voter attributes to opposition
party o ∈ {DPA,SPA}, o = g.12 The utility attributed to the governing and opposition par-
ties is given in (1):
Uilg = αrg + βrDrg(Uni − Un∗) + εlg,
Uilo = αro + εlo
(1)
where Uni denotes the unemployment level in district i and Un∗ some (unknown) target un-
employment that voters compare actual unemployment to. Note that each voter l uniquely
lives in some district i. Following the discussion above, the government party is evaluated
with respect to the unemployment rate in the district in which the voter lives, whereas the
opposition is not. In (1), αrg , αro and βr are unknown parameters, with αrg , αro ≥ 0, de-
scribing predispositions that are common to voters of the same type and region and βr (<0)
a parameter common to all voters within r that describes how voters respond to unemploy-
ment. The error terms εlg and εlo are assumed to be i.i.d. The term Drg is a dummy variable
determining the extent to which a government’s economic policy (with respect to unem-
ployment) enters the voters’ utility functions. This is determined by our assumptions on the
behavior of clients. More specifically:
Dn,g=DPA = Ds,g=SPA = 0;
Dn,g=SPA = Ds,g=DPA = 1; (2)
Dc,g=SPA = Dc,g=DPA = 1
where n = “north”; c = “central”; s = “south”.13 These equations reflect the assumptions
that clients do not consider unemployment caused by a government of their patron relevant
for their vote (first row), but do hold the government of the other party accountable (second
row). The non-clients in the central region hold both parties accountable for unemployment,
when in government (third row).
Next, consider the predispositions αrg and αro. The assumptions that voters in the north
(south) are clients of the DPA (SPA) (and therefore have a positive allegiance to the DPA
11With data on the fraction of clients in various parts of the country, we would be able to estimate a model
where different voter types exist in each part. Obviously, these data do not exist. But the idea that there are
mostly clients in the north and south and mostly non-clients in central regions seems a good approximation.
The validity of this assumption is supported by our empirical results.
12For ease of presentation, we start by considering one election only and dropping the time index t .
13As a slight abuse of notation, we use ‘g = DPA’ and ‘o = SPA’ to indicate which party is in government
and opposition, respectively.
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(SPA) irrespective of whether or not this party is in government) and that voters in the center
have no predispositions imply:
αn,g=DPA = αn,o=DPA > 0; αs,g=SPA = αs,o=SPA > 0; αc,g = αc,o = 0. (3)
A voter will vote for the government party if the utility attributed to g exceeds that of oppo-






} = Pr{αrg + βrDrg
(
Uni − Un∗) + εlg > αro + εlo
}
= Pr {εlo − εlg < αrg − αro + βrDrg
(
Uni − Un∗)}
= F (αrg − αro + βrDrg
(
Uni − Un∗)) , (4)
where F denotes the cumulative distribution function of εlo − εlg . If εlg and εlo are (indepen-
dently and) exponentially distributed, the difference (F ) is a double exponential distribution.





= dnan,g=DPA − (1 − dn − dc)as,o=SPA + dcβc(Uni − Un∗)
+ (1 − dn − dc)βs(Uni − Un∗) (5)
where EiDPA (EiSPA) denotes the expected number of votes for the DPA (SPA) and dn (dc) is




= dsas,g=DPA − (1 − dc − ds)an,o=DPA + dcβc(Uni − Un∗)
+ (1 − ds − dc)βn(Uni − Un∗) (6)
where ds is a dummy indicating that i ∈ s.
Equations (5) and (6) describe the relative number of votes for the governing parties
as a function of, respectively, (i) the positive predisposition of their own clients; (ii) the
negative predisposition of the opposition party’s clients; (iii) the response of non-clients to
the rate of unemployment; and (iv) the response of the opposition party’s clients to the rate
of unemployment.
For our empirical application, we introduce time (t) and reduce (5) and (6) to the follow-




= βt0 + βtj1 Unit + βtgDtg + εit , i = 1, . . . ,35; t = 96,97,01; j = n, c, s (7)
where V itg (V ito ) denotes the vote share of the governing (opposition) party in district i in
t = 1996,1997,2001; j denotes the region (n = north, c = central, s = south) that i lies in,
Unit is the unemployment rate in district i in t,Dtg is a dummy variable indicating the region
to which the governing party is linked, and εit is a white noise error term.
14This derivation is similar to that in Kirchgässner (1985). For more details about the vote function, see
Schneider and Frey (1988) or Mueller (2003).
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The Appendix shows how (7) follows from (5) and (6). Most importantly, the parameters
βtn1 , β
tc
1 , and βts1 in (7) reflect the way voters in the various regions respond to unemployment
and therefore provide estimates of the parameters βn, βc, and βs in (5) and (6). Note that (7)
includes unemployment in the region of the governing party as a regressor. This allows us
to directly test our assumption that voters in these regions do not respond to unemployment,
i.e., βtn1 = 0 (βts1 = 0) after a DPA (SPA) government. These tests provide support for the
assumption.
The coefficients βt0, β
tj
1 , and βt2 in (7) will be estimated with OLS. Formally, the hypoth-
esis presented in the previous subsection yields a test of:
H0 : 0 > βtn1 = βtc1 = βts1 , t = 1996,1997,2001;
vs. H1 : 0 = βtn1 > βtc1 > βts1 , t = 1996,1997;
0 = βts1 > βtc1 > βtn1 , t = 2001.
Under the null hypothesis, voters in the three regions respond (negatively) to unemployment
in a way similar to that observed in very many countries across the world (Mueller 2003).
The response does not differ across regions. The alternative states that in 1996 and 1997
voters in the south (i.e., those that oppose the governing DPA) react negatively and most
strongly to unemployment during the DPA government. Voters in central regions (without
a clientelistic relationship to a party) react negatively but less strongly. Finally, voters in
the north (DPA-clients) do not let unemployment affect support for the DPA at all. In other
words, because the policies of the clientelistic party DPA favor the north, northern voters are
the most forgiving to this government where economic consequences are concerned. The
opposite is predicted in 2001. The SPA clientelism favors the south, whose voters are now
expected to be the most forgiving. The strongest effect of unemployment is now predicted
for the north.15
Note that H1 predicts extreme, opposite effects under the two governments. A traditional
application of vote functions does not distinguish between regions (predicting H0). There-
fore, we first estimate the model imposing the null that all voters respond to unemployment
in the same way. The results are given in the ‘no polarization’ columns of Table 2. The co-
efficient for unemployment is negative in all three elections (indicating that the governing
party has less support in districts where the unemployment is higher), and statistically sig-
nificant in two of the three cases. The explanatory power of this model (R2) is between 0.24
and 0.51. Taken by themselves, these results would support the traditional public choice
finding that a government’s election result is negatively affected by unemployment.
The explanatory power increases substantially when we allow the coefficients to vary
across regions (‘polarization’ columns of Table 2). These results show important differences
across regions and elections. In the north, when the DPA is in government voters do not
react statistically significantly to unemployment. In the center and south, negative responses
15When analyzing the 2001 data, we had to deal with one outlier, the southern mountain district, Skrapar.
This is the birthplace and electoral zone of the socialist prime minister in this period, Meta. In line with the
clientelism described, his government enacted various policies favoring this district. Aside from “passing out
important jobs to supporters from his native district, Skrapar” (ICG 2001), he gave priority to the reconstruc-
tion of the main road to this district, decreasing the travel time from Tirana from about 5.5 to 3.5 hours. As a
consequence, support for the SPA was extreme, with a 85–15 split between SPA and DPA. Nevertheless, un-
employment in this remote district was by far the highest in the south, at 25%. Due to these extreme numbers,
we drop this outlier from the analysis below. A note, accompanying Table 2, presents the results including
Skrapar.
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Table 2 Estimated vote functions
DPA Government SPA Government
1996 1997 2001
Variable no polarization polarization no polarization polarization no polarization polarization
Constant −0.124 0.690 −0.982 −0.693 0.377 0.148



























−3.001 −2.484 −1.746 1.669
(3.336)* (2.048)** (1.714) (1.455)
0.993
(0.422)
βnorth2 0.972 0.124 1.306 0.429 — —
(5.950)* (0.789) (5.373)* (0.836)
βsouth2 — — — — 0.408 0.245
(2.135)** (0.609)
R2 0.29 0.37 0.51 0.59 0.24 0.58
Notes. The coefficients β are defined in (7). β1 is the coefficient related to unemployment, β2 is the coefficient
related to the district the government party is linked to. For the analysis in 2001, we dropped the outlier district
‘Skrapar’. This is explained in footnote 15. Inclusion of Skrapar increases the coefficient βsouth1 to 3.956
(1.854). Though large, the coefficient is still not significant at the 5%-level. The coefficient βsouth2 reduces to−0.107 (0.267) and the other coefficients remain unchanged
*Statistically significant at the 1%-level
**Statistically significant at the 5%-level
to the unemployment level are observed. The strongest (negative) response is found in the
south. A formal test of H0 versus H1 shows that the equalities in H0 are rejected in favor
of the inequalities of H1 (p < 0.01) in both years. It is remarkable how much the results
change in 2001, when the SPA is in government. Though the aggregate (‘no polarization’)
result resembles the 1996 and 1997 results, the disaggregated results differ substantially, in
the predicted direction. The north is no longer forgiving. There is a negative and statistically
significant effect of unemployment on support for the government. In contrast, voters in the
center and south, who were not forgiving for the DPA government, show no statistically
significant effects.16 Once again, a formal test of H0 versus H1 shows that the equalities in
H0 are rejected in favor of the inequalities of H1 (p < 0.01).
The rejection of H0 means that our results support our main hypothesis, that clientelism
causes voters to respond asymmetrically to government policies. The fact that this result
is observed in the (opposite) predicted direction for the two distinct governments makes it
especially strong. In particular, the notion of a politically polarized country finds support.
Note that if we had not taken account of this polarization, we would have concluded that
the effect of unemployment on the vote is similar to that found in numerous studies. Finally,
the results for the central region are interesting. In 1996, this is closer to that for the north
16Note from the standard deviations reported in Table 1 that there does not appear to be any relationship
between the significance of coefficients in the regression and the variance of unemployment rates in a region.
Hence insignificance does not seem to be caused by very small variances.
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Table 3 Estimated vote share of DPA
DPA Government SPA Government
1996 1997 2001
a b c a b c a b c
North 67% −2% −3% 46% +3% −10% 52% +5% —
Central 63% −4% — 27% −6% — 42% −4% —
South 49% −17% — 22% −8% — 38% −2% +6%
Notes. We used the coefficients in Table 2 to estimate the (two-party) vote share of the DPA assuming an
unemployment rate of 10% (columns a). We then estimated how this share would change (in percentage-
points) if unemployment were to rise to 20% (columns b). Finally, columns c show the effects of dropping the
polarization (i.e., setting the coefficients β2 equal to zero). All coefficients (including non-significant ones)
were included in the estimations
than that for the south. This changes in the direction of the results for the south in 1997
and 2001. It may be the case that (changing patterns of) internal migration to Tirana (in the
center) is starting to affect the extreme north-south polarization (as suggested by ICG 2001,
for example). It is still too early to judge, however.
To get a better idea about the quantitative effects of polarization and clientelism, we
use the estimated coefficients to simulate the election outcomes in various regions. Table 3
summarizes the outcome of these simulations.
The results show large differences across regions in the support for the DPA (columns a).
Note however, that these differences could simply be due to regional differences in party
support (i.e., polarization caused by predispositions without clientelism). The responses to
unemployment (depicted in columns b) provide evidence of clientelistic voting, however.
The effect of an increase in unemployment from 10% to 20% in a district strongly depends
on the region in which the district falls. In 1996, for example, this would lead to a two
percentage points decrease in support (3% of the original support) if the district is in the
DPA-supporting north but a 17 percentage points decrease (35% of the original) if it is in
the south. Finally, columns c allow us to visualize the effects of ‘pure’ polarization, i.e., the
predisposition of voters towards the two parties. Note from (4) that we can estimate only the
(net) difference in the ‘government’s region’. The results show that this effect can be up to
10%-points. Hence, even without clientelism, the polarization of voter behavior in Albania
is substantial.
4 Conclusions
The specific history of any nation—but especially of a nation going through a transformation
process from communism—is very important to understand its political development. A key
element throughout Albania’s history is a cultural and geographical polarization. This paper
argues that after the fall of communism, this divide has continued to exist. It has led to
a political environment where clientelistic parties reinforce society’s polarization. We have
shown that this clientelism systematically affects voting behavior. Moreover, we have shown
that a proper evaluation of democratization in Albania requires looking beyond elections per
se and taking this clientelism into account.
The fact that the polarization of Albanian politics includes clientelism follows from the
differential electoral response to unemployment that we observe. Regional polarization in
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itself would imply distinct voting across regions, for example with northern voters support-
ing the DPA and southern voters voting for SPA. We observe this in our data. The fact that
northern voters are forgiving towards the DPA but not towards the SPA, while the reverse
holds for southern voters, cannot be explained by regional polarization per se, however. The
observation that the DPA favors the north in a patron-client relationship and the SPA is a
clientelistic party supporting the south does provide a rationale for this observation.
An interesting question, of course, is why clientelism plays such an important role in Al-
bania. There are two possible explanations. One is related to path dependence, namely the
existing regional division, possibly historically founded on the existence of two important
clans (Doll 2003), which facilitates the polarization that has existed in Albania for cen-
turies.17 The other explanation is based on the fact that formal governmental institutions are
still underdeveloped. It has been argued that rational expectations imply that political can-
didates must make promises that they can actually fulfill if elected (Myerson 1993). This
does not necessarily hold for electoral democracies where government institutions have re-
mained underdeveloped, however.18 This may give rise to serious agency problems, making
promises of political candidates more difficult to enforce. In turn, this may lead voters to
rely more heavily on other social structures. In other words, as long as formal governmental
institutions do not function properly, informal institutions like clientelism will actively fill
the vacuum (Gërxhani 2004).
A better functioning of government institutions may be the key to overcoming polariza-
tion and clientelism. As long as clientelistic parties are able to use the government to serve
their clients, it may be expected that voters will behave the way they have been doing. In
turn, this gives the parties no reason to change. Only if formal institutions develop that may
better guide and control government policies may it be possible to break the centuries old in-
formal institution of clientelism that in the democratic era has taken the form of clientelistic
voting.
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the original author(s) and source are credited.
Appendix
In this appendix, we start with the probability derived in (4) in the main text, that voter i of
type k will vote for the governing party:
pig = F
(
αrg − αro + βrDrg
(
Uni − Un∗)) ,
where F denotes the cumulative distribution function of εlo − εlg . If εlg and εlo are (indepen-
dently and) exponentially distributed, the difference, F , is a double exponential distribution,
17In a recent study of 27 political systems in postcommunist countries, Armingeon and Careja (2008) con-
clude that path dependency is an important aspect of the limited institutional change the political systems of
these countries have experienced since the early 1990s.
18Schedler (2002, p. 37) argues that a characteristic of electoral democracies is that though they manage to
run fair elections they “fail to institutionalize other vital dimensions of democratic constitutionalism, such as
the rule of law, political accountability, bureaucratic integrity, and public deliberation.”




1 + eαrg−aro+βrDrp(Uni−Un∗) ,
pio = 1 − pig =
1
1 + eαrg−aro+βrDrp(Uni−Un∗) ,
(8)
where pio denotes the probability that voter l, in district i will vote for the opposition party.
Now, let ni denotes the number of voters in district i. The expected number of voters in
i voting for g is given by Eig = nipig . Recall that we assumed in the main text that there are
no DPA- (SPA-)clients in the south (north), and that there are only non-clients in central and
that the number of non-clients in the north and south is negligible.










































= dnan,g=DPA − (1 − dn − dc)as,o=SPA + dcβc(Uni − Un∗)
+ (1 − dn − dc)βs(Uni − Un∗), (10)
which is (5) in the main text. Equation (6) can be derived in a similar way.
The regression equation for which we estimate the parameters is given by (7). The
relationship with (5) (i.e., (10)) and (6) is as follows. The error term in (7) reflects the
difference between the expected (Eig) and observed votes (V iGOV) for the government




). The constant term in the regression equation captures the term in
Un∗ and allows for a non-zero mean of the error distribution (μ) (e.g., after the DPA gov-
ernments in 1996 and 1997: βt0 = (−dcβc + dsβs)Un∗ +μ). The terms in β2 include clients’
predispositions (e.g., after a DPA government: an,g=DPA). Finally, the terms in βtj1 are dis-
cussed in the main text.
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